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 MODELING TERRORIST RADICALIZATION  
Aziz Z. Huq 
 
[Forthcoming -- Duke Journal of Law and Social Change – (2010)] 
 
Recent high-profile terrorism arrests and litigation in New York, 
Colorado, and Detroit have brought public attention to the question of 
how the government should respond to the possibility of domestic-origin 
terrorism linked to al Qaeda.  This symposium essay identifies and 
discussing one emerging approach in the United States and Europe which 
attends to the process of terrorist “radicalization.”  States on both sides of 
the Atlantic are investing increasingly in developing an epistemology of 
terrorist violence.  The results have implications for how policing 
resources are allocated, whether privacy rights are respected, and how 
religious liberty may be exercised.  This essay traces the development of 
state discourses on “radicalization” in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  It argues that understanding this new “radicalization” 
discourse entails attention to interactions between nations and between the 
federal government and states as well as to the political economy of 
counter-terrorism. 
 
Academic analysis and critique of public and private discrimination 
against Muslim Americans after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has 
followed two tracks. In the first track, scholars have cataloged violations of 
constitutional rights after 9/11.1 This is scholarship as penitential didacticism. By 
enumerating atrocities, scholars hope to quicken sorrow and provoke behavioral 
change. Blending the descriptive and the moralistic, they aspire to inculcate by 
aversive example.2 In the second track, scholars take culture rather than law as 
their target. This is scholarship as kulturkampf. The scholars identify popular 
cultural depictions of Muslims qua terrorists as key catalysts for discriminatory 
                                                 
 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am very grateful to 
Bernard Harcourt for insightful comments and aid.  My thanks to Ellen Fisher and 
Meredith Angelson who helped with research into this general area. Finally, I am very 
grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which supported the original research.    
1 The best of this genre bear witness at a granular level to the experience of rights 
violation, see, e.g., TRAM NGUYEN, WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS NOW: UNTOLD STORIES FROM 
IMMIGRANT AMERICA AFTER 9/11 (2005), or provide a synoptic analytic framework, 
linking current policies to historical precedents, see, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 953, 976 (2002).  I too have written in this mode.  See Aziz Huq, The New 
Counterterrorism: Investigating Terror, Investigating Muslims, in LIBERTY UNDER 
ATTACK: RECLAIMING OUR FREEDOMS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 167 (Richard C. Leone & 
Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2007).  
2 See Murad Hussein, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm 
in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 938 
(2008); see generally Tracey Maclin, “Voluntary” Interviews and Airport Searches of 
Middle Eastern Men: The Fourth Amendment in a Time of Terror, 73 MISS. L.J. 471 
(2003).    
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policies and attitudes.  They thus condemn the frequency of negative 
representations of Muslims and Arabs in film, popular culture, and public 
discourse3 as an invitation to or a legitimation of improper animus.4  
 
This essay suggests a third approach to the discrimination question that is 
especially salient at a time of fresh terrorism arrests in the United States and 
increasing attention to domestic-source terrorism. This is scholarship as 
epistemological archeology. Rather than looking at what the state does to Muslim 
Americans or at how the media represents Muslim Americans, I suggest we should 
look at how the state represents them. In particular, I suggest a focus on the 
epistemic predicates of terrorism policies. North American and European 
governments have recently mapping how individuals decide to commit acts of 
terrorism. Governments term this process “radicalization.”5 While these 
governments have long acknowledged and addressed the problem of terrorism, this 
investment is a new development. This process develops “[n]ew slots . . . in which 
to fit and enumerate people.”6  Investment in “radicalization” modeling pays 
dividends in the form of legitimacy for policies of investigation and prosecution 
bottomed on the state’s claim of expertise. The state’s epistemological assertion is 
especially forceful in the terrorism domain because, unlike other areas of risk 
regulation, from pandemic disease control to environmental catastrophes, it is a 
field where the state claims to have privileged access to information and where it 
has fewer academic competitors.     
 
The resulting state taxonomies merit study for two reasons. First, claims of 
state expertise redirect the vector and intensity of counter-terrorism policies, 
particularly those concerning religious speech and conduct. Second, the state’s 
epistemology of religious and ethnic identity also limits and channels opportunities 
for political and religious expression for a larger minority population of Muslims, 
Arabs, and South Asians in the United States and Europe.  
 
Part I situates this project in a larger intellectual tradition generally 
unfamiliar to the legal academy and explains why that tradition merits extension. 
Part II examines “radicalization” policies on the state level in the United States, at 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., JACK SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A PEOPLE 
(2d ed. 2009); John Tehranian, The Last Minstrel Show: Racial Profiling, the War on 
Terrorism and the Mass Media, 41 CONN. L. REV. 781 (2009); Tung Yin, Jack Bauer 
Syndrome: Hollywood’s Depiction of National Security Law, 17 S. CAL.  INTERDISC. L.J. 
279 (2008).   
4 This work also suggests new forms of constitutional prohibitions ought to forestall 
new violations.  See Sunita Patel, Performative Aspects of Race: “Arab, Muslim, and South 
Asian” Racial Formation After September 11, 10 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 61 (2005).  
5 I retain quotation marks for the term “radicalization” through the essay.  I do not 
doubt individuals do, in fact, become persuaded to commit acts of terrorism.  I use the 
quotation marks to underscore that the “radicalization” under discussion is the discrete 
discursive formation, not the social process itself.     
6 IAN HACKING, HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 100 (2002).  
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the federal level, and then in the United Kingdom. Lengthy, perhaps tedious 
exposition of divergent policies is warranted here given the absence of previous 
descriptive accounts. Part III evaluates and critiques the trajectory of 
“radicalization” policy along methodological, political economy, and 
consequentialist grounds.   
 
I should emphasize at the outset the tentative nature of my investigation. 
My goal here is largely descriptive. I hope to persuade the reader that there is a 
new form of state “expertise” being developed, and that this body of expertise 
warrants scholarly attention. 
 
I. 
 
Governments generate policies based on understandings of social facts and 
social dynamics. Like social scientists, governments value parsimony because  
“[n]o administrative system is capable of representing any existing social 
community except through a heroic and greatly schematized process of 
simplification and abstraction.”7 These understandings can be the result of public 
debate and deliberation, or they can emerge from investments of bureaucratic time 
and expertise. In evaluating the risks of climate change for example, federal 
government bureaucrats may look to published scientific studies, they may conduct 
their own research, or they may rely on interest groups to bring them information. 
The epistemic bases of government policy are almost always varied. The selection 
of “simplification[s] and abstraction[s],” their upstream sources, and their 
downstream effects, can all be isolated and studied.   
 
To target terrorism, a government might wish to start off with some 
understanding of who becomes a terrorist, and how the transformation happens.8  
For the first five years after the 9/11 attacks there was little public information 
about how North American and European states conceptualized the 
“radicalization” process. But that is changing. In the past few years, American 
state police forces, the United States federal government, and several European 
governments have published policy documents describing how individuals turn to 
political violence. The authors of “radicalization” literature attempt to construct a 
descriptive taxonomy of terrorist motivations and interactions to enable prediction 
of future acts of violence.9  “Radicalization” so defined appears to be a new object 
of state scrutiny and epistemological investment.10   
                                                 
7 JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE 
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 54 (1998).  
8 I do not deny that a government might not attend to these causal questions.  States 
fought crime and wars long before bureaucrats thought about their causes. 
9 See generally Aziz Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in 
Counterterrorism (2009) (draft on file with author) (discussing empirical problems 
generated by pressure toward prophylactic responses in counter-terrorism).  
10 I have failed to locate any documents from the relevant jurisdictions herein 
discussed predating 9/11 that discuss “radicalization.”  
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As the state turns to the production of “knowledge” and “expertise,” so too 
must scholarship that attempts to understand counter-terrorism reorient itself. In 
turning to epistemology to understand state practice, I am following a tradition 
established by historian and cultural theorist Michel Foucault. Foucault argued that 
“truth” could be characterized as “a thing of this world,” which is “centered on the 
form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it . . . subject to 
constant economic and political incitement.”11 Elsewhere, Foucault explored the 
relationship between how government acts and “discursive formations,” i.e., 
“statements different in form, and dispersed in time [that] form a group [because] 
they refer to one and the same object.”12 He urged scholars to focus inquiries on 
“whether the political behavior of a society, a group, or a class is not shot through 
with a particular, describable discursive practice” that in turn would “define the 
element in politics that can become an object of enunciation.”13  This essay should 
be understood in that vein.  
 
Foucault’s lesson is emphatically not the facile one that knowledge is an 
instrument in the hands of the powerful. In his histories, diffuse “band of experts” 
organize “lots of hypotheses and prejudices and tidy theories” into a “postulated 
set of rules that determine what kinds of sentences are going to count as true or 
false in some domain.”14 What matters are thus not the rules themselves but the 
conditions that make them count as “true.” These conditions enable “[the state] . . . 
to do something new with people”; one can treat them as “disciplinary objects” 
within a new field of possible identities and categories.15  Knowledge, on this 
account, does not repress, it constitutes.16  To borrow Ian Hacking’s phrase, it is a 
matter of “making people up,” not simply controlling them.17     
  
 More traditional political scientists have also studied the complex and 
bilateral connection between state epistemological practices and state policies. Of 
special note is the work of Yale anthropologist and political scientist James C. 
Scott, who has traced a history of state efforts “to make a society [more] legible,” 
i.e., more discernable and quantifiable.18 This desire for legibility, Scott explains, 
is “a central problem in statecraft” insofar as it is an adjunct to the “classic state 
                                                 
11 MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER 
WRITING 1972-1977 131 (Colin Gordon ed. 1980).  
12 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 32 (A.M. Sheridan Smith 
trans., Harper Colophon Books ed. 1976) (1969).  
13 Id. at 194; see also EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 23 (1979) (adopting the concept 
for the study of Western texts about the “Orient”).  
14 HACKING, supra note 6, at 76-77.  
15 Id. at 79.   
16 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 11, 138-
43 (R. Hurley, trans. 1978). 
17 See HACKING, supra note 6, at 99.  
18 SCOTT, supra note 7, at 2, 13. 
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functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion.”19  Increasing 
legibility, Scott argues, augments a state’s capacity for control.20  The more the 
state knows about the distribution of and variance in social practices, the easier it is 
for it to direct the use of coercive force. As a correlative, “illegibility . . .  has 
provided a vital margin of political safety from control by outside elites.”21   
 
There is, hence, a rich interdisciplinary tradition of studying the state’s 
epistemic bases for public policies. This tradition, however, has not yet been 
extended to the study of counterterrorism policies.   
 
II. 
 
 This Part begins by examining the most influential and interesting of 
governmental approaches to “radicalization” in the United States, which have 
emerged at the subfederal level before turning to federal models. This Part then 
outlines the development of “radicalization” policy in the United Kingdom. 
 
A. 
 
 The trend in “radicalization” policy in the United States defies the 
conventional wisdom in policy and constitutional law in that it is a state (New 
York) government that has taken the lead in a national security matter.22 While the 
federal government has been a laggard, the first, and perhaps most influential, 
analysis of “radicalization” has emerged in a publication by the New York Police 
Department (“NYPD”). In the wake of the New York study, the Pennsylvania 
Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission issued a training 
manual addressing “radicalization.” Because local and state police are on the front 
lines of interacting with most urban Muslim-American communities, the analysis 
adopted by state agencies may be especially significant as an index of frontline 
policies.   
 
At the threshold, however, federal and state sources diverge on their 
assessment of the severity of the domestic-source terrorist threat facing the United 
States. A decision to invest in understanding “radicalization” implies a geographic 
distribution of terrorist risk where domestic source threats constitute a principal 
share of the policy concern. Part of the work of the “radicalization” literature, 
therefore, is to substantiate the claim that this is a policy problem meriting serious 
attention.   
 
                                                 
19 Id.  The process is never aimed at a perfect mapping: “No administrative system is 
capable of representing any existing social community except through a heroic and greatly 
schematized process of simplification and abstraction.”  Id. at 22; accord id. at 309.    
20 See id. at 77.  
21 Id. at 54.  
22 See, e.g., MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 24-39 
(2000).   
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The National Intelligence Estimate (“NIE”) addresses this issue in a July 
2007 document entitled The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland.  This analysis 
picked out the growing strength of al Qaida in western Pakistan as the principal 
threat. It argued that al Qaida retained the ability to send agents into the United 
States from overseas.23  The NIE noted a “growing number of radical, self-
generating cells in Western countries” and an expanding “radical and violent 
segment of the West’s Muslim population.”24  But the NIE also observed that “this 
internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe [in the United States] as 
it is in Europe,” and that other “non-Muslim groups . . . probably will conduct 
attacks . . . on a small scale.”25 Intelligence briefings produced during the 2008 
presidential election campaign further downplayed domestic-origin terrorism.26 
Congressional testimony from the National Counterterrorism Center (“NCTC”) in 
March 2009 affirmed that assessment. The NCTC rejected the idea that there had 
been “community-wide radicalization” of the Somali-American community in 
Minneapolis after some young men from that city traveled to the Horn of Africa to 
join the Islamist Shabab insurgency.27    
 
By contrast, a report published by the NYPD identified a more serious 
problem. It asserted that “jihadist ideology . . .  is proliferating in Western 
democracies at a logarithmic rate” and that “radicalization permeat[es] New York 
City, especially its Muslim communities.”28  Unlike the federal assessment, the 
state assessment was cast in terms of imminent and geographically specific 
concern. A subsequent codicil to the report claimed the term “permeate” had been 
used in the neutral sense of dissemination. But the tone and context of the NYPD’s 
assessment suggested that the department viewed Muslim-Americans as a source 
of significant threat.   
                                                 
23 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE 
TERRORIST THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND 5 (July 2007) 
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf. The National Intelligence 
Estimate is “the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on 
national security issues and designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop 
policies to protect US national security interests.” Id. at 2.   
24 Id. at 7.  
25 Id. at 7.  
26 Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, Reduced Dominance is Predicted for U.S., WASH. 
POST, Sept. 10, 2008, at A2 (discussing national security briefing given to 2008 
presidential candidates, which de-emphasized terrorism in favor of climate change and 
resource conflicts as major concerns).  
27 Violent Islamist Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement 
of Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, 
Directorate of Intelligence) http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/031109Liepman.pdf 
[hereinafter Liepman testimony]. 
28 MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (“NYPD”), 
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 8, 66 (2d ed. 2009), 
(www.nypdshield.org/. . . /NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf. . . [hereinafter 
NYPD Report] (emphasis added). 
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Echoing that assessment, Senator Joseph Lieberman, chair of the Senate’s 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, warned in 2007 of a 
“rise of domestic terrorist cells, inspired by but not necessarily directly linked to al 
Qaeda [as] an emerging threat to our nation’s security.”29 Senator Lieberman 
further explained that the threat, in his view, was inextricably tied to the Muslim-
American community:  “We have thought that American Muslims were more fully 
integrated into American society than Muslim communities in Europe.” He 
continued, “I believe that remains true but, obviously, not for all Muslims in 
America.”30  Senator Lieberman is one of the few political actors at the federal 
level to endorse and promote the model of “radicalization” generated at the New 
York state level.31   
 
Corresponding to the variance in threat assessments, the first and most 
prominent analysis of “radicalization” in the United States emerged at the state 
level. The NYPD’s Intelligence Division published Radicalization in the West: The 
Homegrown Threat in August 2007.32  Until that time, the NYPD had never 
published an analytic report, and the change in approach was not explained. The 
NYPD’s Report does not state why or by whom the document was commissioned. 
There is no evidence that New York City’s democratic branches, its mayor and city 
council, sought the report. Nor is there a clear statement about how the report was 
intended to be used. The report vaguely explained that its aim was to “assist 
policymakers and law enforcement officials . . . by providing a thorough 
understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically.”33  But the Department 
added a later “statement of clarification” to some public versions of the report, 
                                                 
29 Transcript of March 14, 2007 U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee Hearing on Islamist Radicalization at 2 (Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman) 
[hereinafter “Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript”]. Available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=2fb
6902f-72e9-45a6-b5b2-15389ed18ec3 
30 See Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph Lieberman, Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, “Violent Islamist extremism: Government 
Efforts to Defeat It” May 10, 1007. Checked quote against webcast available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=a3a
45e4d-8a9f-4a54-a245-f50743eb1b71 
31 Which account is correct? Divergent assessments of the underlying risk of domestic-
source political violence in the U.S. are hard to evaluate.  There is no clear benchmark to 
set them against.  The most obvious metric is the frequency of attacks.  But this is 
obviously insensitive to fluctuations in the underlying number of immanent terrorist threats 
within the United States.  Moreover, since there have been no attacks in the United States 
since 2001, the metric is also too lumpy to be of much use. 
32 Rather confusingly, while the August 2007 version of the report remains on the 
NYPD’s website, a different edition of the report, containing a “Statement of Clarification” 
with responses to critics is available at New York City government’s public information 
site. See http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_Report-
Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.  [hereinafter NYPD Report II].   
33 NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 2.  
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disclaiming any intention to be “policy prescriptive.”34  By rejecting any claim to 
prescription, and by laying claim to a mantle of neutral expertise, the report 
situated itself as a legitimating basis for subsequent policies.   
 
Moreover, the NYPD report’s tone and content indicated an effort to set 
and legitimate an agenda for “policy-makers” in state and federal political 
branches. Suggestive of this advocacy goal, the report included a series of “Outside 
Expert’s Views” from internationally recognized academics and policy experts, 
each speaking admiringly of the Department’s expertise in “how to detect imported 
terrorists, new converts and homegrown operators.”35 These “expert” views, rather 
than supplementing the analysis of the report, validated its bona fides and 
underscored its aspirations. Presumably, obtaining such imprimaturs of authority 
was not cheap. The department’s efforts to secure evidence of its neutrality, 
respectability, and reliability were consistent with a more ambitious account of the 
report’s aims.36  The report, in other words, was an opening bid in “the creation of 
a self-constituting class of experts located within a new knowledge.”37 
 
The NYPD report’s analytic ambition also bespeaks a larger aspiration. 
The authors used a broad scope, documenting ten case studies of alleged or 
completed terrorist conspiracies: five from Europe and Canada and five from the 
United States. However, the report has a narrow focus along a different axis:  all 
ten case studies were linked explicitly or implicitly to al Qaeda. The sample 
population for the report comprised all terrorism incidents in the world, but the 
actual sample included only terrorism explicitly or notionally connected to Islam. 
Selection, clearly, was not random, but directed by an interest in certain forms of 
terrorism.    
 
Elaborating these case studies, the report perceives a “remarkable 
consistency” in the “radicalization” process. The report proposes four stages to the 
“radicalization” process, “each with its distinct set of indicators and signatures.”38  
These are: 1) pre-radicalization; 2) self-identification; 3) indoctrination, and 4) 
jihadization. In the last term of the sequence, a connection between religious belief 
and terrorism is worked into the basic discursive matrix of the report.  In a 
noteworthy rhetorical move, these categories are vested with empirical certainty 
and heft by graphical representations. The authors of the report included graphics 
that chart, with apparently almost day-by-day accuracy, temporal transitions of 
individual terrorists in particular cases from one stage to another.39  The level of 
putative accuracy is surprising given concessions elsewhere in the report about the 
                                                 
34 NYPD Report II, supra note 33, at 11, 12.   
35 Id. at 13, 15. 
36 Consider by way of analogy law professors’ habit of larding star footnotes with 
credits to celebrated colleagues.  
37 HACKING, supra note 6, at 77.  
38 NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 7. 
39 Id. at 19, 54; see id. at 81 (timeline).     
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necessarily fragmentary evidence of individual motivations.40  The degree of 
accuracy in the “radicalization” graphs, however, is consistent with an effort to 
establish the aura of academic credibility via a claim to precision that underlying 
data cannot support. 
 
The four stages of “radicalization” act as a funnel:  once a person enters, 
he or she might not reach “jihadization,” but will remain “a threat.”41   This has 
expansive consequences. Consider the definition of the “pre-radicalization” phrase 
stipulated by the report. Individuals are “pre-radical,” according to the NYPD’s 
logic, when they live in geographic Muslim enclaves, which are “‘ideological 
sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought”; when they are between 15 and 35 
year old males; and when they are middle class and educated through at least high 
school.42 That entire class of individuals is already in the funnel and thus a 
potential “threat.” Cashed out in operational terms, the NYPD’s analysis means 
that almost the whole young, male Muslim population of urban areas in the United 
States constitutes a threat because they all are in the “pre-radicalization” stage.43 
This is, to say the least, a surprisingly broad claim at odds with the ambient level 
of terrorist attacks in the United States.  
 
The body of the report provides case-by-case analyses of ten cases of 
alleged terrorism drawn from incidents in Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Australia, 
Toronto, Portland, Northern Virginia, Lackawana, and New York City. By 
aggregating the case studies, the report claims to identify “typical signatures” 
associated with each of the four phases. The “typical signatures” of the pre-
radicalization phrase, for example, are “[b]ecoming alienated from one’s former 
life”; “[g]iving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling and urban hip-hop gangster 
clothes”; “[w]earing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard”; and 
“[b]ecoming involved in social activism and community issues.”44 (A subsequent 
version of the report contained a response to criticism by civil liberties advocates, 
stating that “a greater degree of religiosity . . . cannot be used as a signature.”45 
The main text of the report that alludes to these indicia, however, remains 
unchanged and thus merits analysis). Signatures of the “jihadization” phase, in 
turn, include the undertaking of “Outward Bound-type activities,” and, in one 
striking passage, the owning of “wilted plants”, which may be a sign that “noxious 
explosives” are being prepared in a location.46 The end of the four phrases is an 
                                                 
40 See id. at 10 (noting that the “subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviors 
involved in the process of radicalization makes it difficult to isolate or even monitor”).   
41 Id.  
42 NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 22-23.  These minimal definitional, however, are 
violated by the report’s own later examples, which include individuals who do not satisfy 
the educational and class qualifications.  See id. at 67 (James Elshafay).    
43 Id. at 23.   
44 Id. at 31.  
45 NYPD Report II, supra note 32, at 12.   
46 NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 44, 49. “Wilted plants” were seen in one British 
apartment where explosives were being prepared.  The report extrapolates from that 
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acceptance of an “individual duty to participate in jihad” that precedes any 
“operational planning for jihad or a terrorist attack.”47   
 
In the wake of the NYPD’s report, the Pennsylvania Municipal Police 
Officers’ Education and Training Commission issued a training manual entitled 
“Radical Islam: A Law Enforcement Primer.”48  This training manual merits 
attention as an elaboration of state-level operational approaches to 
counterterrorism. The authors did not, however, include an explicit analysis of the 
process of “radicalization” with anything like the NYPD report’s level of detail. 
The Primer’s first section, entitled “Typologies and Misconceptions,” instead 
contains a disordered sequence of terms, definitions, and notes on early Muslim 
history.49  The discussion moves indiscriminately, and confusingly, between 
historical and theological claims. It drifts from doctrinal issues such as a definition 
of the “Sunnah,” to complex theological notions, such as the abrogation of early 
verses of the Qur’an by later ones.50   The manual’s second section is entitled 
“Radical Islam,” and begins with a one-page summary of Islamic theology from 
the thirteenth century Ibn Taymiyyah to the twentieth century Sayyed Qutb.51  This 
section gives the impression that a centuries-long sweep of Islamic intellectual and 
theological development can be distilled down to a single thread:  the endorsement 
of violence for political ends. The third and final section continues the same theme, 
identifying “modern radical groups,” including al Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, 
and Hezbollah, that share “five pillars of radical ideology” despite the fact that one 
(Hezbollah) emerges from Shia Islam, which is quite separate from and often 
antagonistic to the Sunni tradition from which the others emerge.52 While glossing 
over elemental differences, the Primer’s mosaic of disparate facts communicates 
the impression that the problem of violent terrorism is not linked only to a small 
fraction of Muslims, but rather adheres in the structure and dictates of the faith 
tradition itself. 
 
B. 
 
                                                                                                                            
observation to the conclusion that viewing wilting plants generally should trigger concern.   
47 Id. at 43. Note again the conflation of religious behavior and terrorism.  
48 Municipal Police Officers’ Education & Training Commission, Radical Islam: A 
Law Enforcement Primer (Bill Kaiser, ed., undated) [hereinafter “Pennsylvania Primer”].  
49 Id. at 2-12. 
50 Id. at 7-8.  The idea of naskh, or abrogation, is complex and long-contested in 
Islamic theology.  See WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 68-74 
(1997). 
51 Pennsylvania Primer, supra note 48, at 13-19. It should go without saying that this is 
a staggering feat of compression. 
52 Id. at 20-23. This passage also conflates justifications for the violence with the more 
prosaic notion of the five pillars of core practice in mainstream Islam. For an excellent 
recent account of Shia political mobilization, including Hezbollah, that makes plain how 
distinct it is from Sunni politics, see LAURENCE LOUËR, TRANSNATIONAL SHIA POLITICS 
(2008).  
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 Whereas state models of “radicalization” have been powerfully informed 
by a view about the underlying threat level and a normative vision of religious 
tradition—which I explore at greater length below—the federal response has been 
fragmented, hesitant, and incomplete. Assumptions of federalism, at least in this 
domain, are turned on their head.     
 
No federal agency has published a formal analysis of “radicalization.” 
Congress has passed no law directly relating to the matter. But the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (“FBI”) and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) have 
separately suggested definitions in the course of congressional testimony. In 
addition, one Senate committee has generated reports that, while heavily dependent 
on the NYPD’s efforts, try to make a distinctive contribution. In general, federal 
responses have demonstrated a more tempered and careful position on religious 
identity. Blanket accusations about one faith’s co-religionists are few and far 
between.   
 
The FBI has generated the least in terms of policy documents. In written 
testimony delivered to Congress in May 2007, an assistant director of the FBI 
explained that “consistent with the First Amendment, [the FBI] defines radical 
individuals as persons who encourage, condone, justify, or support the commission 
of a violent act or other crimes against the U.S. government, its citizens or its allies 
for political, social, or economic ends.”53 In March 2009, FBI congressional 
testimony addressed the possibility that members of Minneapolis’s Somali-
American community might have traveled to and from the Horn of Africa, where 
they would be ideologically transformed and might be persuaded to execute 
terrorist attacks in the United States. While expressing “concer[n]” about the 
possibility of “recruitment of individuals” to fight in Somalia, the FBI testimony 
recognized “a variety of motivations affecting such individuals.”54  Unlike the 
NYPD and Pennsylvania definitions, the FBI thus does not couple religion and 
terrorism tightly. 
 
  By contrast, other federal agencies have invested time and attention to the 
“radicalization” problem to craft more elaborate analyses. Statements from DHS, 
in particular, suggest it views “radicalization” as a nuanced and fluid process of 
social transformation. Former Department of Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff declared in congressional testimony that “DHS defines 
                                                 
53 Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Attempts to Defeat It Before the S. Comm. 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong.  (2007) (statement of John 
Miller, Assistant Director, Office of Public Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (May 
10, 2007) 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=a3a
45e4d-8a9f-4a54-a245-f50743eb1b71 [hereinafter Miller Statement].   
54 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (statement of Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant Director, National 
Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress.htm.  
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radicalization as the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the 
willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social 
change.”55 Chertoff and other DHS officials have suggested that the Department is 
careful not to define “radicalization” in religious terms. They use the term “to 
encompass a wide range of threats against our country, including various white 
supremacy and fascist organizations.”56  Before Congress, Chertoff rejected any 
equation “of violent extremism with an entire religion such as the Muslim 
religion.” Within the faith, however, Chertoff explained that:  
 
There is a subset of individuals who we have to characterize as 
violent Islamic extremists, meaning that they are adherents to an 
ideology that is distinctive and has a narrative of the world. It is 
one that at least uses the language of Islamic symbols; it may be a 
perversion of the language, but it uses that rhetoric. And it has as a 
goal acts of violence that are aimed at creating a society that will 
ultimately be radically different from the one we have now, one 
which is not characterized by democracy, freedom and tolerance, 
but one that is characterized by intolerance and totalitarianism.57  
 
DHS has also taken positions on the mechanisms of “radicalization.” Addressing 
“Islamic radicalization,” DHS’s chief intelligence officer Charles Allen 
distinguished “radicalization from terrorism by emphasizing the difference 
between related social patterns that may all lead to terrorism.”58 In the same 
testimony, Allen cautioned that there “are diverse ‘pathways’ to radicalization,” 
rather than a “‘one-way street’” of radicalization.59    
 
Ideology, including religious ideology, still plays a central role in the 
DHS’s account. A key part of the “radicalization” path, Secretary Chertoff 
explained, is that “people have to be persuaded” and “presented with a 
comprehensive world narrative.”60  In that process of persuasion, Allen identified 
“a variety of human and institutional catalysts, such as formal and informal 
                                                 
55 Before S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 
(2007) (written testimony of Michael Chertoff, Sec’ry of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec.) 
(http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/031407Chertoff.pdf [hereinafter Chertoff testimony]; 
accord Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (written testimony of 
Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and 
Analysis)   
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/270.pdf [hereinafter “Allen 
testimony].  
56 Chertoff testimony, supra note 56, at 1.  
57 Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 29, at 5.  
58 Allen testimony, supra note 56, at 4. 
59 Id. at 5; accord Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 29, at 28 (Allen 
confirmed that “there’s no single pathway. But we did identify nodes” such as “an 
extremist mosque” or “a university group”).  
60 Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 29, at 6.   
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religious institutions” and “[c]harismatic leaders,” and risk factors, such as 
“[i]nsular communities with little exposure to moderating influences” and the 
“deterioration of familial, social and societal ties” that may precipitate 
“radicalization.”61 In the hearing, Allen singled out prisons and “university 
group[s]” as radicalizing hubs.62  
 
It seems the DHS’s understanding of “radicalization” is in flux. In his 
March 2007 testimony, Secretary Chertoff stated that although that DHS was 
taking “a comprehensive approach” to the issue, it was still working with the 
academic and scientific communities in “[d]eveloping a better understanding of the 
radicalization phenomenon,” including cooperating with British counterparts.63  In 
late 2008, DHS issued a request for participation, asking private “experts . . .  to 
participate in a radicalization-research effort” to “systematically identify key 
intervention strategies that can help to prevent or counter radicalization in the 
United States.”64 The Department under Secretary Janet Napolitano, however, has 
not published any conclusions based on that call.      
 
 Evidence about the position taken by the intelligence agencies of the 
federal government, as opposed to its law enforcement arms, is relatively sparse. 
One piece of evidence is a statement filed in congressional hearings respecting 
Somali-Americans traveling to fight with the Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. An 
official from the NCTC stated in March 2009 hearings that the decisions of these 
Somali-Americans were “the result of a number of factors . . .  that come together 
occasionally when dynamic, influential leaders gain access to despondent, 
disenfranchised young men.”65 Recruiters offer young men an alternative to gang 
subculture, according to the NCTC, in the form of “religiously inspired 
indoctrination to move them toward violent extremism.”66  NCTC testimony 
emphasized the psychological rather than the religious dynamics of the process, 
which sweeps in “vulnerable” young men, “lacking structure and definition in their 
lives at home.”67 Like the DHS, the NCTC publicly articulated a multifactor model 
of “radicalization” attuned to complex social and psychological nuances. 
 
 Congress, too, has started to take a position in the “radicalization” debate. 
Since September 2006, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs (“Senate Homeland Security Committee”), led by Senators 
Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, has held hearings about the problem of 
“domestic radicalization.” The first hearing, for example, focused on “prison 
                                                 
61 Allen testimony, supra note 55, at 6-7. 
62 Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 29, at 28.   
63 Chertoff testimony, supra note 55, at 2. DHS Chief Intelligence Officer Charles 
Allen agreed that “work on radicalization is preliminary and by no means complete.”  
Allen testimony, supra note 55, at 5. 
64 I was asked to attend this meeting.   
65 Liepman testimony, supra note 27. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
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radicalization.”68  In a May 2008 committee report, the Senate Homeland Security 
Committee adopted the NYPD’s Radicalization in the West analysis.69  Senator 
Lieberman lauded the NYPD’s analysis as a “breakthrough” that “set the standard” 
for law enforcement.70   
 
The Senate Homeland Security Committee’s contribution to the 
“radicalization” literature focused on the Internet. In a May 2008 report, the 
Committee concluded that the Internet “play[s] a critical role throughout the 
radicalization process.”71  In the Committee’s view, the Internet is a bridge by 
which radicalizing influences enter the United States. It is “the most significant 
factor in the radicalization process today.”72  The Internet, on this account, is a way 
for individuals to find and explore propaganda, to become indoctrinated in the 
cause, and to connect “with the global Islamist terrorist movement.”73  According 
to the Committee, the Internet presents new problems for law enforcement because 
“self-generated violent Islamist extremists who are radicalized online” are unlikely 
to come to law enforcement’s attention through real-world activities or 
connections.74 The report gives two examples of the Internet’s radicalizing 
potential. One involves two Georgia Tech students who made contact with a 
Toronto-based group via the Internet; the other is the case of Derrick Shareef, 
alleged to have been planning an explosives attack on an Illinois mall.75 In both 
cases, it is unclear whether the Internet played a unique role that could not have 
been played by telephone communications.  
 
C. 
  
The British discourse on “radicalization” emerged in a series of 
government documents that outline general counterterrorism policy rather than 
homing in on the problem of “radicalization.” I first outline the overall British 
                                                 
68 Prison Radicalization: are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Prison Blocks?: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov. Affairs, Sept. 19, 2006, available at  
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=b60
2edb5-1faa-4011-b12c-c312678d1b71.  
69 Violent Islamist Extremism, The Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat: 
Majority & Minority Staff Report: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov. 
Affairs, 110th Cong. 4 (2008) [hereinafter “Violent Islamist Extremism”], available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf.  
70 Leslie Phillips, Sen. Lieberman Applauds Pioneering report on Homegrown Islamic 
Radicalism, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
Aug. 15, 2007, available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecor
d_id=350f95d1-d9bf-446e-b6a3-c3d13df07a56&Region_id=&Issue_id= [hereinafter 
“Lieberman statement”]. 
71 Violent Islamist Extremism, supra note 69, at 10. 
72 Id. at 11. 
73 Id. at 12. 
74 Id. at 14.   
75 Id. at 13. 
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policy framework and then document the development of an understanding of 
“radicalization.”  
  
In 2003, the Home Office, the cabinet-level entity charged with crime and 
security policy, adopted a four-prong counterterrorism strategy called “Contest.” 
Details of the Contest strategy, which includes analyses regarding domestic 
terrorism, were released to the public in 2006 and amended in 2009. The Contest 
strategy’s four overarching prongs are: preventing terrorism, pursuing terrorists, 
protecting the public, and preparing the public.76  The “preventing terrorism” or 
“prevent” strand, implicates the “radicalization” problem. It is not clear what 
model of “radicalization” the British government used up to 2006, when the 
Contest system was first released to the public. In early 2005, the Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Center, part of the British security services, had developed a “three-tier 
model … to describe the varying degree of connection between targets and the Al 
Qaida leadership,” with the tiers corresponding to direct links, loose affiliations, 
and ideological affinities.77 This three-tier model is not elaborated in any public 
document, and appears to have been abandoned. There is some evidence that the 
July 7, 2005 London bombings prompted a significant shift in British 
understanding. According to testimony from the head of specialist operations at the 
Metropolitan Police Service to Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, 
the security services had until 2005 been “working off a script which actually has 
been completely discounted from what we know as reality.”78   
 
Whatever the old script was, it was formally superseded by 2006. The first 
prong of the Contest strategy, “Prevent,” is now dedicated to “preventing terrorism 
by tackling the radicalisation of individuals.”79  “Prevent,” in turn is made up of 
three major strands: ameliorating institutional weaknesses and gaps, hindering 
                                                 
76 PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, 
COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY, 2006-7, 
Cm. 6888, at 1-4, available at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/136036/countering.pdf.  
77 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, REPORT INTO THE LONDON TERRORIST 
ATTACK ON 7 JULY 2005, 2006-7, Cm. 6785, at 27, available at 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/corp/assets/publications/reports/intell
igence/isc_7july_report.pdf. 
78 Id. at 30 (italics omitted). Reviewing British counterterrorism strategy in 2004, 
lawyer John Upton identified Professor Magnus Ranstorp of the Center for the Study of 
Terrorism at the University of St. Andrews as a formative influence on U.K. governmental 
thinking about “radicalization.” Ranstorp had a “four-stage process by which al-Qaida’s 
jihadists are formed.  First, a recruit undergoes spiritual preparation; then he is provided 
with basic military and survival skills.  Following this it is his duty to place himself at the 
fault-lines between Islam and the West; the armed struggle comes last.”  John Upton, In the 
Streets of Londonistan, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Jan. 22, 2004.   This appears to be a 
different four-stage process from the one offered by the NYPD.  What one makes of the 
proliferation of overlapping models—evidence of intellectual ferment or symptoms of 
pathological uncertainty—is unclear. 
79 Countering International Terrorism, supra note 76, at 9. 
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extremists from spreading their messages, and winning the hearts and minds of 
United Kingdom’s civil society—in particular Britain’s marginalized population.   
 
The pivotal document in the United Kingdom “radicalization” policy is a 
2006 Home Office paper outlining the Contest strategy. Later Home Office papers 
deal with the “Prevent” strand specifically, and give further detail about 
radicalization. Finally, a 2008 paper issued by the United Kingdom’s Security 
Service (MI-5) also addresses “radicalization.” The result is a rich and not entirely 
consistent “discursive formation.”  
 
i. Countering International Terrorism. The first official analysis of 
radicalization by the United Kingdom government was the 2006 Home Office 
strategy paper Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s 
Strategy.80  Publication of this strategy paper came only two months after the 
Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee warned that “across the whole 
of the counter-terrorism community the development of the home-grown threat and 
the radicalism of British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic 
thinking.”81 The 2006 paper can be read as a response to that challenge.   
 
According to Countering International Terrorism, “radicalization” is the 
first of two steps that may lead to violence. First, an individual alienated from 
larger society adopts extreme views, thereby becoming “radicalised.”82  Second, a 
“tiny minority” of these radicalized individuals become terrorists “by financing, 
lending facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by actively participating in 
terrorist attacks.”83 The paper cautions that “[t]he processes whereby certain 
experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalized, to the 
extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances, are critical to 
understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members and sustain support for 
their activities.”84 But the report also adds that this is neither a predictable nor a 
mechanical process:  “There are a range of potential factors in radicalization and 
no single factor predominates. It is likely the catalyst for any given individual 
becoming a terrorist will be a combination of different factors particular to that 
person” including a “sense of grievance and injustice,” “a sense of personal 
alienation or community disadvantage,” and the “exposure to radical ideas.”85  
 
Like the FBI and DHS approaches, Countering International Terrorism 
clearly states that “radicalization” is not a unified and linear concept.86  Rather, 
                                                 
80 Id. at 5. The paper is a “partial” publication because some parts of the U.K.’s 
counter-terrorism strategy remain classified.  
81 Intelligence and Security Committee, supra note 77, at 30. 
82 Countering International Terrorism, supra note 76, at 10. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 9. 
85 Id. at 10. 
86 Indeed, the security services appear to have reached this conclusion as early as 2004. 
See Intelligence and Security Committee, supra note 77, at 29 (work undertaken before 
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there is a cluster of factors that may be associated with “radicalization” in 
particular cases. Nor does that study assert a tight nexus between religion and 
terrorism. Also implicit in its analysis is the suggestion that a person who has 
embarked on the first stage of “radicalization” will not necessarily continue on to 
its next stage. By further implication, “radicalization” is not a one-way ratchet like 
the “funnel” posited by the NYPD report.   
 
While the Countering International Terrorism strategy paper rejects the 
notion of a predictable path to violence, it does enumerate several “[p]otentially 
radicalizing factors.” These include political, social, and religious elements such 
as:  globalization and its economic, political, and cultural destabilizing effects; 
anti-Westernism in Muslim countries, fuelled by the belief that “the West does not 
apply consistent standards in its international behavior”; international incidents, 
including the first and second Gulf Wars and the war in Afghanistan; personal 
alienation, or economic or social disadvantage; and exposure to “radical ideas” or 
an inspiring figure already committed to extremism.87   A March 2009 restatement 
of the Contest strategy stated flatly that “[t]here is no single cause of 
radicalization” but rather a variety of concerns, including differences on foreign 
policy issues such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the treatment of detainees in 
Guantánamo Bay.88 This breaks from the NYPD approach, which emphasizes faith 
and personal, psychological dynamics, but makes scant mention of political 
differences. It also supplements the United States federal approach, which does not 
address political grievances. The British approach to “radicalization” considers the 
studied form of terrorism as an example of political violence, while the American 
approach to the data deracinates the problem of terrorism from any distinctively 
political roots.  
 
But by introducing a political dimension, Countering International 
Terrorism creates a new ambiguity. The report distinguishes a person “who has 
become highly radicalized” from “a terrorist” or a supporter of terrorism.89  That is, 
“radicalization” is not defined solely in terms of attitudes to violence. The report 
fails, however, to define adequately “radicalization.” Should “radicalization” be 
understood as movement along a spectrum of political views or of religious views? 
Countering International Terrorism gives no clear answer.   
 
ii. The Prevent Strategy. Between 2006 and 2008, the British 
government’s ideas about “radicalization” evolved. In 2006 the United Kingdom 
government emphasized international dynamics and foreign policy questions. In 
                                                                                                                            
2004 demonstrated that “there is no simple Islamist profile”). 
87 Countering International Terrorism, supra note 76, at 10.   
88 PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, PURSUE 
PREVENT PROTECT PREPARE: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 2009-10, Cm. 7547 at 41, available at 
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/UnitedKingdom2009.pdf.  
89 Countering International Terrorism, supra note 76, at 10.  
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2008, it highlighted more local circumstances.90   
 
A 2008 Prevent strategy paper picks out five “interlocking factors” with 
causal links to “violent extremism”:  (1) “an ideology which justifies terrorism by 
manipulating theology as well as history and politics”; (2) “radicalisers and their 
networks”; (3) vulnerable individuals; (4) the lack of community capacity to resist 
“radicalization”; and (5) perceived and actual grievances against nation and 
government.91 Psychological and local factors are thus blended with international 
dynamics. In a separate appendix, the document enumerates a longer list of factors 
influencing “radicalization.” This annex treats “radicalization” as an individual 
process, in which characteristics such as a “personal crisis,” underemployment, 
social exclusion, and links to criminality are important.92  The appendix further 
tethers “radicalization” to the presence of radicalizing “propagandists, ideologues, 
or terrorists” and “extremist material.”93   
 
The implicit account of “radicalization” here is closer to the American 
socio-psychological model of personal crisis and resolution through conversion 
than to Countering International Terrorism’s effort to take political motivations 
seriously. Indeed, political motives are largely absent. Subsequent analyses of 
“radicalization” published under the “Prevent” umbrella also focus on immediate 
social circumstances rather than national or international political grievances.94   
That change in direction raises a possibility of transnational influence and 
borrowing:  did American models of “radicalization,” with their focus on socio-
psychological causes, influence the development of British doctrine? If so, why did 
the latter borrow from the former rather than vice versa? And if the borrowing of 
policies across jurisdictions does occur, is there a set of shared epistemic standards 
to ensure that the superior model is adopted?  
 
The Prevent strategy leaves several key questions unanswered. First, like 
the Countering International Terrorism paper, it does not contain a clear definition 
                                                 
90 But the Prevent strategy cautions that “extremism … will need to be addressed at 
every level—international, national and local.”  HM Government, The Prevent Strategy: A 
Guide for Local Partners in England (July 2008) at 7, [hereinafter Prevent: A Guide for 
Local Partners], available at 
http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/crimereduction029.htm. This at least 
suggests that the British government distinguishes between domestic and its international 
dynamics that propel “radicalization.” 
91 Id. at 5.   
92 Id. at 69. 
93 Id.  
94 See Department for Education and Skills, Promoting Good Campus Relations: 
Working With Staff And Students To Build Community Cohesion And Tackle Violent 
Extremism In The Name Of Islam At Universities And Colleges 7-9 (2006), available at 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/hegateway/uploads/ExtremismGuidancefinal.pdf (noting that, in 
universities “extremism can be also disproportionately affected by the simultaneous 
presence of a few like-minded individuals,” by ethnic segregation, and by charismatic 
outside speakers). 
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of “radical” that distinguishes between political and religious metrics for 
measuring extremism. Nor does it define how “radical” ideas are to be 
distinguished from “moderate” ones.95  Extremists are defined, for example, as 
those who “misrepresent the Islamic faith.” 96   But the strategy paper does not 
explain how “correct” representations of Islam are to be identified. Second, the 
Prevent strategy paper introduces a new term, “violent extremism,” to refer to what 
was previously called “radicalism”97 without explaining the new term.   
 
iii. “Radicalization” on Campus. The term “violent extremism” is, 
however, discussed at more length in a Department of Education and Skills report 
on “radicalization” on college campuses.98  This report defines “[u]nacceptable 
extremism” as a spectrum of conduct “from incitement of social, racial or religious 
hatred, to advocating the use of violence to achieve fundamental change to the 
constitutional structure of the United Kingdom, to carrying out terrorist acts.” It 
cautions that individuals “can and do” hold extreme views, but “authorities are 
concerned [only] with any form of extremism that espouses, promotes or leads to 
violence: ‘violent extremism.’”99   
 
The terminological shift in British counterterrorism might be an effort to 
concede the legitimacy, if not the wisdom, of variance from median political and 
religious views, while at the same time sorting for cases in which violence is 
probable. The linguistic shift is an effort, in short, to decouple the risk of violence 
from the possession of disfavored religious or political views.  This suggests the 
British government’s sensitivity to “the importance of language and 
communication” in counterterrorism.100   
 
iv. 2008 Security Services Briefing Paper. In August 2008, British 
journalists reported that the domestic British Security Service MI-5 had developed 
a briefing note entitled Understanding Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the 
UK “based on hundreds of case studies of those involved in or closely associated 
with terrorism.”101 Like the NYPD report, expertise is claimed even as its 
                                                 
95 To the extent an inference is feasible, the strategy paper suggests that 
“radicalization” is a matter of religious strategy.  Prevent: A Guide for Local Partners, 
supra note 90, at 17-18 (discussing strategies for challenging “violent extremist ideology” 
and supporting instead “mainstream” Islam).   
96 Id. at 17. This raises two problems.  First, does the state have the competence to 
make decisions about what is or is not “correct” Islam?  Second, assuming it does, has it 
communicated effectively its understanding of the limits of acceptable Islam? 
97 Id. at 6. 
98 See generally Department for Education and Skills, supra note 94, passim. 
99 Id. at 6. 
100 See Rachel Briggs & Jonathan Birdwell, Radicalisation among Muslims in the UK 
25 (MICRON, Working Paper No. 7, 2009), available at 
www.microconflict.eu/publications/PWP7_RB_JB.pdf.  
101 Alan Travis, The Makings of an Extremist, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), August 20, 
2008.     
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evidentiary and methodological predicates are rendered invisible. The Security 
Services have not released the report, nor is its methodology available. According 
to one journalist’s account of the still-classified note: 
 
[R]adicalisation takes months or years with no one becoming a 
terrorist overnight, and it is always driven by contact with others. 
Exposure to extremist ideology, whether in the form of online 
communities, books, or DVDs, although crucial, is never enough 
on its own. Personal interaction is essential, in most cases, to draw 
individuals into violent extremist networks . . . . [Key factors 
influencing receptivity included] the experience of migrating to 
Britain and facing marginalization and racism; the failure of those 
with degrees to achieve anything but low-grade jobs; a serious 
criminal past; travel abroad for up to six months at a time and 
contact with extremist networks overseas; and religious naivety.102 
 
This analysis echoed the multifaceted FBI and DHS approaches to “radicalization” 
and also a May 2006 United Kingdom parliamentary Intelligence and Security 
Committee conclusion that “there is no simple Islamist extremist profile in the 
United Kingdom and that the threat is as likely to come from those who appear 
well assimilated into mainstream United Kingdom society, with jobs and young 
families, as from those within socially or economically deprived sections of the 
community.”103   
 
III. 
 
“Radicalization” policy in both the United States and the United Kingdom 
is a work in progress. It is well on its way to coalescing into a series of conditions 
that enable the gathering and evaluation of knowledge. Both governments are 
moving from a standing start. The United Kingdom government candidly admitted 
that its pre-2005 models of political violence were woefully lacking, despite the 
fact that the United Kingdom had had long experience with terrorism as a result of 
disputes over the governance of Northern Ireland. The United States government 
evinced no such candor. The resulting body of literature raises questions of 
epistemology, political economy, and temporal effects.    
 
A. 
 
First, the “radicalization” literature raises epistemic and methodological 
questions. Unlike social scientists, governments are under no obligation to air their 
methodology to public scrutiny and are often able to take advantage of a 
presumption of accuracy, especially in matters such as national security.104  Indeed, 
                                                 
102 Id.   
103 Intelligence and Security Committee, supra note 77, at 30.   
104 See. e.g., Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 
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national security bureaucrats are typically among those viewed by the public as 
models of “selfless administrators”105 whose claims to impartial understanding are 
quickly credited. And when pressed, the government can always reject criticisms 
by claiming to know more than can be revealed to the public. This may be the case 
even if there are methodological or logical flaws in the government’s empirical 
assumptions. But terrorism presents particularly acute epistemic problems:  
terrorists are not transparent about their intentions, particularly to the state; post 
hoc accounts from perpetrators about their motives merit skepticism; and many of 
the normal tools of empirical analysis are unavailable.   
 
Consider in this light the NYPD and Pennsylvania reports. Numerous 
problems are facially apparent with the logic of the NYPD’s analysis. First, several 
of the “typical signatures” mentioned in the report are pervasive in the general 
population, for instance the accumulation of facial hair and poor housekeeping 
skills. Treating facts that are pervasive in the ambient population as indicia of 
terrorist risk loosens constraints on investigative discretion. If almost everyone is a 
suspect, allocations of investigative resources may be distorted by many factors, 
including invidious animus.   
 
A second question arises because some of the putative signals of terrorist 
risk identified in the report are tied to Islamic tradition and custom, e.g., adoption 
of Islamic garb. Recall, however, that the report takes “Islamic-based terrorism” as 
its sole subject at the outset.106  It combines the breadth of a global focus with a 
narrow lens that picks up only incidents that it links to Islam. This methodology is 
known in the empirical literature as purposive sampling, which (unlike random 
sampling) involves “complete discretion” on a researcher’s part as to which 
observations to include in a study.107 Having decided to disregard the full spectrum 
of contemporary terrorist groups and events available within a global sample 
frame,108 and to select only for links to Islam, a researcher cannot then assert that 
the occurrence of Islamic traits or behavior are correlated with a dependent 
variable such as the threat of terrorist violence. To the contrary, any correlation is 
the result of the manner in which the sample was selected from the population.   
 
                                                                                                                            
YALE L. J. 2512, 2541 (2006). The most sophisticated articulation of this view is in ERIC 
A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE 
COURTS (2007).  
105 SAID, supra note 13, at 33. 
106 See NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 5, 14 (extended defense of the focus on al 
Qaida).  
107 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U CHI. L. REV. 1, 105-06 
(2000). 
108 By contrast, a recent RAND Corporation study looked at 648 religious and secular 
terrorist groups to draw inferences about the optimal strategy against al Qaida in Iraq and 
elsewhere.  See SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END: 
LESSONS FOR COUNTERING AL-QAIDA xiii (2008), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741-1.pdf. 
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A third concern relates to the facts of the selected cases. The NYPD report 
mixes studies of completed terrorism conspiracies with incidents in which an 
attack was apparently forestalled; it discusses both realized and potential threats. 
Including potential threats, however, raises selection concerns. A journalistic 
account of the events in Lackawanna, New York—one of the incidents studied in 
the report—has cast doubt on whether those arrested ever intended to commit a 
terrorist attack.109  A plea bargain in a highly visible and emotional terrorism 
prosecution, chronologically and geographically proximate to the 9/11 attacks, is 
not a substitute for evidence of actual risk. Worse still, some of the case studies 
involve facts in part crafted by the police. In one of the New York City conspiracy 
arrests, police relied on evidence from an informant working for the government 
who encouraged and aided the eventual defendant.110 Questions of coercion, 
entrapment, and the perverse incentives implicated by the use of informants are 
beyond the scope of this paper. But informants are relevant insofar as they have 
influence on the cases chosen for prosecution and the facts of those cases. 
Informants and their police handlers select targets. In the terrorism context, 
informants play large roles in planning and encouraging attacks. In relying on 
cases involving informants—including one in New York City—the NYPD report 
thus relies on facts created by the police themselves. This is a feedback loop: the 
police influence the content and direction of prosecutions and then rely on those 
prosecutions as evidence of the underlying crime problem.   
 
These three analytic concerns are compounded by the NYPD report’s 
studied ambiguity on questions of methodology. In a section on methodology, the 
report explained that the NYPD “dispatched detectives and analysts to meet with 
law enforcement, intelligence officials and academics” at locations of terrorist 
attacks or conspiracies.111 Despite this, it is hard to link primary empirical research 
to the contents of the report. The 143 footnotes of the report contain no reference 
to any interviews (even with names omitted); instead the 143 footnotes direct 
readers to five books, three court documents, and a mass of newspaper articles.112 
Parts of the report do not identify their sources; nor are any non-public sources 
apparent from the arguments and facts presented in the text. The report does not 
allow for careful parsing of its empirical claims, even though there is no reason 
why the first-hand sources relied upon could not have been identified, at least 
through pseudonyms.113  
                                                 
109 See DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA SIX AND 
ROUGH JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2007). 
110 See Band of Brothers, HARPER’S, October 2006, at 20 (transcript of 
communications between Siraj and informant); William K. Rashbaum, Window Opens On 
City Tactics Among Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at B29; William K. Rashbaum, 
Closing Arguments in Trial of Subway Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at B3 
(“brightest bulb”). 
111 NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 15. 
112 Id. at 87-89. 
113 Further, it is difficult in reading the individual case studies to identify any 
meaningful quanta of information that could not have been derived from newspaper 
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Opacity about the sources of knowledge matters.  The manner in which 
knowledge is derived influences conclusions. This is illustrated in Foucault’s 
landmark study of the birth of modern medicine. In that work, the French historian 
emphasized a paradigm change in the manner in which medical knowledge was 
being produced. After this rupture, physicians elevated the “privileges of a pure 
gaze, prior to all intervention and faithful to the immediate … and those of a gaze 
with a whole logical armature, which exorcised from the outset the naivety of an 
unprepared empiricism.”114 That is, the choice of methodology was linked to a 
resistance to seeing the possible significance of methodological selection. The 
“radicalization” literature has a similar double structure to the one Foucault 
describes. Reports assert a disinterested, neutral gaze, implicitly asserting a 
technocratic expertise to vouchsafe the resulting conclusions, while at the same 
time erasing from the record all traces of method—traces that would enable 
critique and challenge.   
 
It is legitimate to ask whether ambient bias—or even simple aversion to a 
religious faith that is generally unfamiliar and unknown—distorts analytic 
outcomes. Both the NYPD and the Pennsylvania documents tie Islam to terrorism 
at the outset. They posit a categorical linkage between that faith and political 
violence. In this fashion, neither is “mere unconditioned ratiocination”115 without 
preconditions because both documents treat the “Muslim” a priori as a source of 
risk and harm. Both extend a long intellectual history that Edward Said has most 
famously excavated, a history that is based on “the ineradicable distinction 
between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority.”116 That categorical divide is 
enacted both by the decision to couple Islam and terror in the analytic categories 
and by the sampling methodology.   
 
Consider by way of example the Pennsylvania training manual’s treatment 
of religious texts and identity. Like the NYPD’s report, the Pennsylvania manual 
assimilates religious motives to terrorism by singling out “radical Islam” from 
other justificatory accounts of terrorism at the threshold. It then backs away from 
this conflation. For example, the training manual states early on that “most 
Muslims are not jihadis.”117  But then in describing the doctrinal tenets of Islam, it 
makes the sweeping assertion that under the Qur’an, “[f]ighting was then 
sanctioned against all those who worshipped others along with Allah” and that “it 
became an obligation to fight against all those who do not believe in Allah.”118 By 
stating that “Muslims believe that Muhammad is the best exemplar . . . in all 
circumstances” and then quoting a non-Qur’anic passage in which Muhammad 
                                                                                                                            
reports. See, e.g., id. at 22-28 (describing first stage of five conspiracies).   
114 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC 131 (A.M. Sheridan, trans., Vintage 
Books 1994) (1963). 
115 Id. at 15. 
116 Id. at 42. 
117 Pennsylvania Primer, supra note 48, at 3.  
118 Id. at 9-10. 
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orders the execution of non-Muslim prisoners of war, the training manual suggests 
that violence against non-believers is generally endorsed by Islamic texts.119 The 
manual fails to consider the status of the non-Qur’anic passage as a binding text, 
and says nothing about its possible divergent readings.  Through its description of 
Islam, the manual also highlights arguments and canonical stories that can be used 
to argue for violence.120  Although the training manual does add the caveat that 
only “[r]adical individuals” will focus on the violent passages and ideas, the caveat 
serves more as a way of fending of accusations of bias, rather than a meaningful 
attempt to dispel the suggestion that these justifications are endorsed by Muslims 
generally. To the contrary, it claims precisely that. For example, it asserts that 
“[t]he motivation to engage in jihad is based on concepts [sic] that jihad is the ‘best 
deed’ a Muslim can perform.”121   
 
By failing to mention a large body of literature repudiating those 
arguments,122 the training manual implies that Muslims in general have a warrant 
for terrorist violence in their religious beliefs and texts that is distinct in scale and 
type from the warrant for political violence furnished by other religious texts such 
as the Bible or the Torah. Islam is again configured as distinctively dangerous and 
violent.123 
 
B. 
 
It is one thing to critique governments’ approach to modeling 
“radicalization;” it is another to explain observed variance in approaches to 
religious and ethnic identity. The second question thus raised by the 
“radicalization” literature, therefore, is one of political economy:  even given the 
small size of the sample policies, what can be discerned about the political and 
social forces generating different discursive formations? 
 
The “radicalization” literature is not the product of disinterested experts, 
but emerged in the context of local and transnational political economies. In the 
United States, it emerged against the backdrop of interjurisdictional competition 
between states and with the federal government. Internationally, it unfurls against 
tensions and negotiations between nations in both counter-terrorism and other 
security needs. I have mentioned above the possibility of transnational learning 
                                                 
119 Id. at 10-11. 
120 Id. at 10-11. 
121 Id. at 16. 
122 For an accessible example of this literature, see, e.g., KHALED ABOU EL-FADL, THE 
PLACE OF TOLERANCE IN ISLAM (2002). El Fadl elegantly and succinctly explains how the 
texts that the Primer focuses on have been peripheral to Islamic tradition, and how they do 
not provide any license for violence.   
123 This is hardly a unique sentiment in the general culture. See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE 
END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF REASON 123 (2004) (“Islam, more 
than any other religion human beings have devised, has all the makings of a thoroughgoing 
cult of death.”).  
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between the American and British governments regarding models of 
“radicalization,” which might explain the shift in the British discourse from overtly 
political explanations to more local and psychological accounts. If such trans-
Atlantic borrowing does happen, it would be important to know the criteria for 
success in the ensuing tournament of ideas.124   
 
A political economy of “radicalization” might begin by observing the 
greater influence of British Muslims as compared to their American counterparts. 
Muslim communities in the United Kingdom are longstanding, powerful, and 
organized in ways not familiar in the American political scene. The British Muslim 
community first comprised Yemeni, Malaysian, Bengali, and southern Arabian 
migrants who arrived and settled in the late 1800s in port cities such as Cardiff and 
Liverpool.125  Substantial British Muslim populations began to develop in the 
1960s and 1970s. The number of mosques in the United Kingdom leapt from 13 in 
1963 to 339 in 1985.126  According to the last national census (2001), 2.7 percent 
of the British population was Muslim. Of that, 68 percent was of South Asian 
extraction.127  British Muslim populations are characterized by lower-than-median 
socio-economic indicators. They also face more constrained social mobility than 
other British immigrant or autochthonous communities.128   They are also subject 
to high levels of racial animus and cultural stigmatization. As in other European 
countries, these frictions often coalesce around manifest and visible symbols of 
difference, such as the women’s use of niqabs or hijabs.129  Yet Muslims have 
successfully entered the professions and politics in recent years, and have visible 
presences in the United Kingdom:  in 2003, two Muslims secured seats in the 
House of Commons, and five Muslims have been appointed to the House of 
Lords.130 More widely, “[g]rowing numbers of Muslims have come to regard 
formal political mechanisms as an effective way of getting their problems 
addressed.”131   
                                                 
124 The problem of borrowing between jurisdictions is extensively studied in 
constitutional law. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: 
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005). See also Ernest A. 
Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005).  
125 HUMAYUN ANSARI, THE INFIDEL WITHIN: MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1800 24-30 
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130 Hellyer, supra note 125, at 233.   
131 Ansari, supra note 128, at 18.   
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 As a result, it is more costly for the British government than for the 
American government to slight or to be perceived as slighting Muslim interests. 
Instead, the British government claims it has sought the input of its Muslim 
community constituents. In the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, the 
U.K. government launched an initiative called “Preventing Extremism Together” 
“to engage and consult with Muslim communities” concerning future policy 
responses to domestic terrorist concerns.132 The U.K. government convened seven 
working groups during the summer of 2007, each directed by a nationally- or 
locally-prominent Muslim leader. Each group drafted a report with substantive 
policy suggestions, case studies of successful community-government 
collaborations, and recommendations for legal reform.133  While the Home Office 
publicly welcomed the input,134 the reports had little tangible impact on subsequent 
government policies. Working groups’ leaders later criticized the United Kingdom 
government for moving ahead with policy initiatives before even receiving their 
reports.135  A British security scholar has characterized United Kingdom strategy 
as akin to “classic counter-insurgency policies that aim to divide extremists from 
the moderate majority Muslim community . . .  by engaging with moderate Muslim 
groups . . .  [by utilizing] consultations with and closer regulation of local Muslim 
leaders and Imams; and greater contact with Muslim representatives to address 
Muslim concerns over the use of counterterrorism methods.”136 Consultations, and 
botched attempts to consult, are well understood as part of that divide-and-conquer 
strategy, and not as genuine efforts at gathering new information. 
 
Concern about the electoral mobilization or otherwise adverse reaction of 
Muslim voters may also push the British government to pay close attention to its 
analysis’s implications about Islam and terrorism. The British government has 
resisted the kind of quick connections drawn in the NYPD report between Islam 
and terrorism. Both Countering International Terrorism and the Prevent strategy 
paper cautiously identify a connection between Islam and terrorism. Countering 
International Terrorism states that “a distorted and unrepresentative version of the 
Islamic faith [has been used] to justify violence.”137  The Prevent strategy paper 
                                                 
132 PREVENTING EXTREMISM TOGETHER: WORKING GROUPS, 1-4 (August-October 
2005), http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/152164.pdf 
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129-30 (George Kassimeris ed. 2008).  
136 Brendan O’Duffy, Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the 
UK, 41 POL. SCI. & POLITICS 37, 42 (2008).  
137 Countering International Terrorism, supra note 76, at 1.  
28 Modeling Radicalization  
explains that terrorism is promoted by those who “misrepresent” Islam.138  
Following the lead of these documents, the Department of Education and Skills 
cautions that “[a] clear distinction should be made between  . . . extremist 
individuals and the faith they might claim to be associated with or represent.”139 
The same report observed that “propagating false perceptions about the values and 
beliefs of Islam potentially adds to a vicious circle that may fuel discrimination 
and islamophobia.”140 None of the American literature on “radicalization” 
demonstrates awareness or concern about the possibility of populist backlash 
against Muslim-Americans.141  
 
Conceptual separation of the main body of Islam from religious 
justifications given for terrorism minimizes any spillover legitimization effect on 
ambient discrimination. That separation also serves a strategic purpose by 
narrowing the perceived constituency for terrorist violence. The “population-
centric” approach to counter-terrorism, popularized by apparent successes in Iraq 
in recent years, has prioritized the security of local populations and the legitimacy 
of counter-terror efforts in ending insurgent groups.142   
 
In recent documents, the United Kingdom government has moved beyond 
an effort to disconnect religion from violence, and has instead drawn on empirical 
evidence that suggests that a deficit of religious knowledge presents a concern with 
respect to questions of “radicalization.” Professor Tufyal Choudhury pioneered this 
argument in an April 2007 paper for the government office for Communities and 
Local Government. In The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation, 
Choudhury aggregated research about why people commit acts of violence, 
focusing on the role of religion.143  Examining studies of groups such as Al-
Muhajiroun and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Choudhury argued that research showed that “the 
path to [radicalization] often involves a search for identity in a moment of 
crisis.”144 Whether because it is intrinsically belligerent or because it provides 
marginalized and disparaged communities with increased in-group solidarity, the 
identity of “Muslim” has proven increasingly attractive in recent decades.145 
                                                 
138 Prevent: A Guide for Local Partners, supra note 90, at 17.  
139 Department for Education and Skills, supra note 94, at 6.  
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Drawing on Quintan Wiktorowicz’s pioneering study of the Salafist group Al-
Muhajiroun, Choudhury also observed that those attracted to marginal religious 
groups “are not particularly religious and do not have any significant religious 
education,” and “a lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a common 
feature among those that are drawn to extremist groups.”146 This second, more 
general, conclusion about the role of religious naïveté rests on data about Al-
Muhajiroun’s recruitment dynamics, which might be atypical of terrorism groups 
(especially as Al-Muhajiroun itself disavows any violent intent). Further, there is 
some contrary data suggesting high degrees of religiosity among terrorists who 
self-identify with Islam from their youth.147  Despite this uncertainty, the paper 
recommended that “Muslims will be better equipped to counter violent 
[radicalization] when they have the knowledge and ideas about their faith with 
which to confront extremists.”148 
 
Other governmental entities have reached similar conclusions. The Prevent 
strategy paper flags a “need to develop a stronger understanding of Islam and 
Islamic culture, society and history across all communities.”149  In leaked portions 
of its August 2008 briefing note, the security agency MI-5 listed “religious 
naivety” as a factor in cases where individuals have turned to violence.150   In 
2005, the government-sponsored Working Group on Young People observed that 
“much learning [among British Muslims] about Islam is autodidactic” rather than 
through mosques or family, which creates “opportunities for the propagation of 
extremist ideologies.”151 The correlative to this observation, noted another 
Working Group, was that the Muslim community has a “responsibility to try to 
ensure that the culture of radical ideas and influence” is eliminated, a responsibility 
not generally shared with other faith communities.152 One response to the problem 
is “disseminating a more authentic understanding of Islam.”153  Another 2007 
report based on focus groups with Muslim Londoners identified local imams, 
many of whom migrate with little understanding of Western social conditions and 
problems, as causes of the vacuum in religious understanding. That report 
explained:  “[B]y refusing to engage with young Muslims on contentious issues of 
concern to those young people, [imams] were forcing hungry young minds out 
onto the streets for answers.”154 
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A political-economy approach must consider not only private interest 
groups, but also the interactions between different levels of government and 
different institutions within the government. One example of the difference that 
political economy makes in the distribution and form of knowledge about 
counterterrorism is the reversal of traditional federal and state roles in the United 
States. In contrast to the prevailing wisdom, it has been a state rather than the 
federal government that has taken the initiative on “radicalization,” sometimes 
seen as one of the most important national security issues of the day. Generally, 
state-level innovation in policy is considered a public good.155  Not all state-level 
innovation, however, is to be encouraged. Some “incentive to deviate from the 
division of authority is inescapably built into the federal structure,” creating 
negative interstate spillovers.156  The deviations may shift regulatory burdens onto 
other states, or they can create externalities for the nation as a whole. 
 
Consider one account of the interjurisdictional “contestation”157 underlying 
the genesis of state-level “radicalization” policy. I cannot prove this account. 
Rather, I offer it as a hypothesis supported by at last some circumstantial evidence, 
one that allows for critical examination of the political economy of the 
“radicalization discourse.” The account focuses on bureaucratic rivalries between 
the federal and state level. On this account, the NYPD report is part of a larger 
move to establish the Department’s priority as the premier counterterrorism agency 
within the United States. The NYPD has long contested the superiority of the FBI 
in a protracted and “counterproductive bureaucratic struggle.”158  The August 2007 
“radicalization” report was a preemptive strike in that struggle, a bid to cement the 
legitimacy of a local police department’s intelligence and counterterrorism 
efforts.159 In addition to studying “radicalization,” the NYPD has cultivated 
flattering press for its counterterrorism efforts. This includes a New Yorker article 
that focused almost exclusively on the Department’s perspective.160  A recent book 
                                                 
155 The classic text on interjurisdictional competition concerns taxation and 
expenditure.  See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
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 Modeling Radicalization  31 
 
on the NYPD’s counterterrorism efforts also trumpeted the Department as the 
nation’s “Best Counterterror Force” and gave little space even for discussion of 
substantial civil-liberties concerns raised by the Department’s policies.161 In short, 
the NYPD report can be read as part of a larger campaign being waged for policy 
primacy between jurisdictions within the United States.   
 
Why should a state fight such a battle?  Preeminence has practical 
advantages for individual states. Praising the NYPD report, Senator Lieberman 
added that “Congress must ensure adequate funding” for local law enforcement; 
presumably, the NYPD will be nearer the front of the federal funding line than it 
would otherwise be, given the support of a key Senate committee chairman.162 But 
the NYPD’s approach also creates a new version of the spillover problem. 
Specifically, the NYPD’s approach may be attractive because it appeals to those 
with a priori animus against Muslims. Even if the report’s authors are not affected 
by bias, their work may provide confirmation for those who are so affected. To the 
extent that a flawed analysis is as a result adopted in whole or part by other states, 
a higher rate of civil and constitutional rights violations and inefficient allocations 
of policing resources may follow.  
 
To the extent that the NYPD’s report can be read as a bid for national 
legitimacy, it is also an effort to circumvent local Muslim constituencies. The 
British experience suggests that the presence of a large Muslim population forces a 
government to pay a higher marginal political cost for claiming a connection 
between Islam and terrorism. State governments are more likely than national 
governments to have politically significant groups of Muslim-Americans who may 
take offense at their faith being thus impugned.163 There is also a literature in 
American constitutional law that suggests local governmental units will be more 
protective of religious liberty than the federal government.164  And yet, the 
opposite appears to be the case in the context of “radicalization” policy because of 
a local government’s ability to appeal to a national constituency.   
 
Complicating the political economy picture further, Muslim-American 
political mobilization is in rapid flux. The Muslim-American community is more 
varied than is generally assumed.165  The decennial national census does not 
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contain a question about faith. This renders it hard to gauge the number of 
Muslims in the United States. Estimates range from 1.1 million to 7 million.166   
According to a 2007 Pew Research Center survey, about 65 percent of Muslim-
Americans are first-generation immigrants, while 20 percent are second-generation 
with one or both parents living outside the United States.167 Large Muslim 
communities of considerable sectarian diversity are scattered across the county’s 
urban areas, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, and the Dallas/Fort 
Worth/Houston area. Political mobilization among Muslim-American groups dates 
generally back to the 1996 elections. While in 2000 majorities of South Asian and 
Middle Eastern Muslims supported the Republican ticket, in 2004 they switched 
sides.168  One study estimates that they may “have a potential to make a political 
impact in swing states such as Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio” in future elections.169  
I have postulated above that British Muslims influenced the content and direction 
of British “radicalization” strategy by dint of political voice. Analogously, it is 
possible to imagine that the American Muslim political voice at the national level 
may influence the content of “radicalization” policy in the United States in a way 
that until now has been impossible to discern.   
 
C. 
 
The third and final question is whether “radicalization” literature will 
directly affect policy. The exercise of “epistemological power” 170 by the state in 
this fashion has the potential to affect the direction and intensity of policy, as well 
as to shape the portfolio of political and religious identities available to a larger 
community of co-religionists or an ethnic cohort.   
 
In the context of counterterrorism policy, the understanding of what a 
“terrorist” is and—significantly—how someone becomes a “terrorist” impinges on 
the allocation of investigative and policing resources in several ways. First, 
different understandings will influence the use of controversial investigative 
measures such as the surveillance of mosques and the recruitment of imams as 
informants.171 Police will spend more time cultivating religious leaders as 
                                                                                                                            
AMERICA (1999)).  
166 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS:  MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY 
MAINSTREAM 11 (May, 22, 2007), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-
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167 Id. at 15.   
168 Jalalzai, supra note 165, at 171-72.    
169 Id. at 193   (citing BARRY A KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION 
UNDER GOD: RELIGION  IN  CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993)). 
170 See Michel Foucault, Truth and Juridical Forms, in POWER 83 (J. Faubion, ed. 
2000) (defining epistemological power as “a power to extract a knowledge from 
individuals and to extract a knowledge about these individuals who are subjected to 
observation.”). 
171 See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, How Using Imam in Terror Inquiry 
Backfired on Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at A1.  
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informants if they are told, or otherwise believe, that religious texts and beliefs 
play a catalytic part in “radicalization.” A model of “radicalization” that implicates 
religion, therefore, will tend to shift the distribution of policing resources toward 
these more controversial measures. Recent changes to the FBI’s domestic 
surveillance guidelines proposed by former Attorney General Michael Mukasey 
illustrate one possible vector for this kind of policy change. These amendments 
relax procedural constraints on the use of direct surveillance or informants in 
religious spaces.172  They enable a new balancing of religious liberties against 
security concerns.     
 
Second, the “radicalization” discourse may influence front-end decisions 
about what conduct to criminalize, or charging decisions under inchoate statutes, 
such as the material support to terrorism provisions.173 Elastic, inchoate statutes 
may be applied to cases involving religious conduct with increasing frequency if 
the latter is adjudged by the state to be a proxy for terrorist threat. Accounts of 
domestic-source “radicalization” might also distort aggregate resource allocations 
among divergent catastrophic threats because they amplify cognitive biases.174  
Emphasizing a threat that involves a betrayal of communal confidences at 
moments—on public transport or at work, for example—where a threat was not 
expected may yield different allocations of limited security resources.  
 
Third, different understandings of the relation of terrorism to religious or 
ethnic identity may alter tolerance levels for ambient discrimination within 
governmental institutions. Supervisors may be less concerned about line officers 
who exercise their discretion in discriminatory ways.175   
 
Some evidence of how “radicalization” might be operationalized has 
emerged in Los Angeles. There, in response to concerns about “radicalization,” the 
Police Department initiated a “community mapping” plan to “lay out the 
geographic locations of the many different Muslim populations around Los 
Angeles . . .  [and t]o take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language, 
culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions” so as to 
“identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be 
susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism.”176  The Los Angeles Police 
                                                 
172 See generally The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic Intelligence, 
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Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 533-55 (2007).  
175 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2164 
(2002) (noting that monitoring for bias is more costly when policing is done through 
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176 The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: 
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Chief explained that the department also intended to collect information on 
“languages used in a certain area, the employment rate,” and “who and where the 
city’s Muslim communities are.”177 This mapping project might be seen as one 
way of operationalizing the “radicalization” discourse. The epistemological project 
of understanding terrorism becomes the different epistemological effort to know 
Muslims.   
 
The plan, however, prompted public criticism from Muslim community 
groups and civil liberties advocates. Citing the “fear and apprehension” prompted 
by the plan’s public disclosure, Los Angles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa declared 
that it would not be put into effect.178  Yet, much of its framework has been 
adopted in a new police reporting system used by Los Angeles police to identify 
terrorist threats via the filter of standardized “suspicious activity reports.”179  Just 
as the NYPD’s “radicalization” report influenced Congress, so, too, the Los 
Angeles effort is proving influential within the FBI, which is considering adoption 
of the “suspicious activity report” framework.180   
 
Policy consequences of “radicalization” analysis thus drift between 
jurisdictions. Federalism, far from being a shield for individual liberties, may be a 
cause of erosion of those liberties as local jurisdictions, seeking reputational gain, 
compete to generate tougher and more potentially intrusive policies for adoption 
on the national level. 
 
Finally, “radicalization” cannot be reduced to a matter of “labeling from 
above.”181  Rather, it would be wise to recall Foucault’s insistence that power is 
not reducible to domination and hierarchy. As he stressed in his work on sexuality, 
the exercise of power is dispersed, and involves work and investment on the part of 
power’s subjects as much as its objects.182  Following Foucault, one must attend to 
the opportunities that the new discourse of “radicalization” presents for its 
subjects.  At its edges, “radicalization” creates a zone of semantic uncertainty 
where symbols of faith serve equally as signals of violence. For the suspected 
classes, that is, “the outer reaches of [their] space as . . .  [individuals] are 
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essentially different from what they would have been had these possibilities not 
come into being.”183   
 
Yet it would be a mistake to conceptualize this as a form of simple 
repression. To be sure, “radicalization” changes the marginal cost of certain forms 
of religious behavior and thereby may create a disincentive to communal or 
individual forms of faith. But “radicalization” also creates opportunities for those 
seeking to establish normative distance from the state. The state supplies its own 
counter-narrative by legitimizing certain forms of resistance over others. Rather 
than repression, “radicalization” can be seen, perhaps not without irony, as a path 
of resistance and individuation through the tailoring of a ready-made mold of 
countercultural resistance. It remains to be seen how these openings and resources 
are leveraged in the creation of new political and religious identities.   
 
Conclusion 
 
To understand the forms that emerging approaches to counterterrorism 
take, it is necessary to look to epistemic foundations. The “radicalization” 
literature shows those foundations in process of formation.  Its study implicates 
novel epistemological, political-economy, and legal questions. Further research is 
needed to understand this new, and increasingly significant, determinant of 
counterterrorism policy. 
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